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planning matters during the Survey Period of November 1, 2012, through
October 31, 2013. The reader is warned that not all newly enacted statutes and
decided cases during the Survey Period are presented, and not all aspects of each
cited statute and case are analyzed. You must read and study the full text of each
statute and case before relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of
most cases includes a moral, that is, the important lesson to be learned from the
case. By recognizing situations that have resulted in time-consuming and costly
litigation in the past, the reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of similar
situations arising with his or her clients.
I. THE ESTATES CODE
The 2009 legislature began the process of codifying the current Probate Code
into the new Estates Code. 1 Although called a “code,” the Probate Code is not a
true “code” because it was enacted in 1955, which was before the 1963
legislature began the process of codifying Texas law into twenty-seven codes. The
codification process is supposed to be nonsubstantive. 2
The portion of the Estates Code passed by the 2009 legislature focused on
intestacy, wills, and estate administration. 3 The guardianship and durable powerof-attorney provisions were added in 2011. 4 “The 2011 legislature also made
changes to the previously enacted portions of the Estates Code to be consistent
with amendments it made to the existing Probate Code.” 5 The 2013 legislature
continued to fix issues with the 2009 and 2011 codifications as well as make
substantive changes. 6 The entire Estates Code became effective on January 1,
2014. 7
II. INTESTACY
A. CHILDREN FROM SURROGATE PARENTS
Under prior law, for a person to be a child of his or her mother for intestacy
purposes, the child must either be biologically related or adopted. 8 When a
surrogate mother is used, the child may not be biologically related or adopted,
and thus the intended mother was not considered a mother for inheritance
purposes, even though she was for family law purposes.9 Effective for the estates
of individuals who die on or after January 1, 2014, the intended mother is the
1. Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512.
2. Id. § 11, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1732.
3. See id. § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1512.
4. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 823, § 1.01, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1901,
1901.
5. Gerry W. Beyer, Wills & Trusts, 66 SMU L. REV. 1219, 1220 (2013).
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., § 12, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1732. For charts to convert from the Probate Code
to the Estates Code and from the Estates Code to the Probate Code, see
http://www.professorbeyer.com/Estates_Code/Conversion_Charts_03-17-2014.pdf.
8. Act of May 17, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., Ch. 713, § 42, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1743, 1743,
repealed by Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 680 § 10, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512, 1731.
9. Id.
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child’s mother for intestacy purposes.10 Likewise, the intended father will be
considered to be the child’s father. 11
B. DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP
1. Statute of Limitations
The 2013 legislature added Estates Code section 202.0025 to make it clear
that there is no statute of limitations to a proceeding to declare heirship of a
decedent. 12 Although the provision was effective on January 1, 2014, the
legislature stated that this section is “intended to clarify current law” and that
“an inference may not be made regarding the statute of limitations for a
proceeding to declare heirship filed before the effective date.” 13
2. Unsecured Creditors
The 2013 legislature removed the restriction that only secured creditors could
commence a proceeding to declare heirship. 14 If a decedent dies on or after
January 1, 2014, any creditor, unsecured or secured, may initiate an heirship
proceeding. 15
3. Attorneys Ad Litem
Estates Code section 202.009 was amended to impose a mandatory duty on
the court to appoint an attorney ad litem in an heirship proceeding to represent
the heirs whose names or locations are unknown. 16 The court retains the
discretion to appoint an attorney ad litem for an incapacitated heir. 17
4. Citation
Estates Code section 202.056 now provides that citation may be waived only
for a minor distributee who is under twelve years old. 18 If the minor is twelve or
older, citation may not be waived.19
5. New Requirement
A court cannot enter an order determining heirs unless the applicant files (1)
a copy of the notice and proof of delivery sent to interested parties and (2) an
affidavit of the applicant or a certificate signed by the applicant’s attorney stating
that notice was given, the name of each person who received the notice if not
shown on the proof, and the name of each person who waived citation. 20
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 11, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2740.
Id. § 12, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2740.
Id. § 13, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2740–41.
Id. § 62(g), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2754.
Id. § 14, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741.
Id. (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.004).
Id. § 15, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741.
Id.
Id. § 16, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741.
Id.
Id. § 17, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741–42 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.057).
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III. WILLS
A. FORMALITIES
A prudent attorney should have the testator and the witnesses initial each
page of the will because this practice will make it easier to rebut claims of page
substitution. For example, in the case of In re Estate of Pilkilton, a dispute arose
whether pages of a properly executed will were replaced by different
(“corrected”) pages at a later date. 21 The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed with the
trial court that the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that page
substitution did not occur, especially because no one testified that the testator
executed the will prior to all corrections being made. 22
B. SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVITS
The 2011 legislature amended Civil Practice & Remedies Code
section 132.001 to permit the use of unsworn written affidavits made under
penalty of perjury in lieu of written sworn affidavits. 23 The 2013 legislature
added a provision to Estates Code section 21.005 providing that this procedure
is not applicable to self-proving affidavits on wills executed on or after January 1,
2014. 24
C. TITLE OF DEVISEE
Meekins v. Wisnoski serves as a reminder that a beneficiary’s vested interest in
the estate remains subject to the testator’s creditors, and thus a beneficiary may
lose his or her entire bequest or devise. 25 A beneficiary claimed that a receiver
appointed to sell property of the testator’s estate could not sell his interest
because of the well-established principle that the interest of a beneficiary vests
immediately upon the testator’s death. 26 The Houston Fourteenth Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, explaining that once an executor is appointed,
the executor “holds legal title and a superior right to possess [the] property” to
pay the decedent’s debts. 27 Thus, when the probate court appointed a receiver to
partition and sell estate property to pay a tax debt and the sale properly took
place, the purchaser received the testator’s interest in the property. 28
D. COURT ORDERS RESTRICTING NEW WILLS
A person may disregard without penalty or sanction any portion of a court
order that attempts to prohibit a person from executing a new will or a codicil to

21. In re Estate of Pilkilton, No. 05-11-00246-CV, 2013 WL 485773, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
22. Id. at *4.
23. Act of May 25, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 847, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2119.
24. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2737–38.
25. Meekins v. Wisnoski, 404 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
26. Id. at 697–98.
27. Id. at 698.
28. Id.

106

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

an existing will. 29 This should reduce the practice of some family law lawyers
who routinely include in their orders a mandate that the other spouse not
change their testamentary plan during the pendency of the divorce.
E. FORFEITURE CLAUSES
1. Burden of Proof
The 2013 legislature clarified the party who has the burden of proof with
regard to the enforceability of forfeiture clauses. A forfeiture clause is presumed
enforceable unless the party who wants the clause to be unenforceable
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that just cause existed for
bringing the action and the action was brought and maintained in good faith. 30
2. Strict Construction
Courts strictly construe in terrorem provisions and are unlikely to enforce them
when property disposition is not impacted by the lawsuit. For example, in Di
Portanova v. Monroe, the trial court granted applicants’ request for eight trusts to
be consolidated under the court’s deviation authority provided in Property Code
section 112.054. 31 The court explained that “[b]ecause of circumstances not
known to or anticipated by the settlors, the original terms of the Eight Trusts
would substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the Eight
Trusts in ways [the settlors] could not have anticipated.” 32 The consolidation did
not impact the dispositive provisions of the trusts.
The appellants asserted that the consolidation violated in terrorem will
provisions which stated that forfeiture occurs if an action is brought “for the
purpose of modifying, varying, setting aside or nullifying any provision hereof . .
. on any ground whatsoever.” 33 The Houston First Court of Appeals rejected
this assertion, holding that the suit for judicial modification of administrative
terms was not intended to thwart the testators’ intent and thus did not trigger
forfeiture. 34 In fact, the wills did not prohibit consolidation, and the
consolidation would prevent waste and avoid impairment of the administration
of the trust.35
F. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
In Netherton v. Cowan, the testator’s will devised a beneficiary a remainder
interest in certain real property, but if the beneficiary were to predecease the
testator or die “before the property . . . vests in him,” the property would pass to
an alternate beneficiary. 36 The beneficiary died prior to the holder of the life
29.
30.
31.
pet.).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 20, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2742.
Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 351, §§ 1.01, 2.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1122.
Di Portanova v. Monroe, 402 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no
Id. at 716.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 718–19.
Id. at 718.
Netherton v. Cowan, No. 04-12-00627-CV, 2013 WL 4091773, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San
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estate. 37 When the life estate owner died, a dispute arose between the
beneficiary’s estate and the alternate beneficiary over the ownership of the
land. 38
Both the trial court and the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
property was part of the beneficiary’s estate. 39 The court of appeals explained
that Texas law favors a construction that results in vesting at the earliest possible
time, and thus the remainder interest vested in the beneficiary immediately
upon the testator’s death. 40 In addition, the court noted that the testator’s will
did not include language requiring the holder of the remainder interest to
outlive the life tenant as a condition of the devise. 41
G. CONTESTS
1. Statute of Limitations
A person who believes a will is invalid must contest that will on a timely basis,
or even meritorious claims will be lost. For example, in Omohundro v. RamirezJustus, the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment because the
suit was time-barred under Probate Code section 93 (two years from date of
probate to contest a will subject to limited exceptions not applicable to this
case). 42 Accordingly, the court did not address any of the appellant’s substantives
issues.43
2. Discharged Independent Executor as Proper Party to Contest
In re Estate of Whittington teaches that an independent executor who obtains a
judicial discharge is not a proper party to a subsequent contest of the will. 44 The
probate court admitted the testator’s will to probate and appointed an
independent executor. 45 After completing his duties, the independent executor
obtained a judicial discharge under Probate Code section 149E (now Estates
Code section 405.003). 46 Approximately six months later, a contestant filed a
will contest and had citation served upon the independent executor. 47 The trial
court granted the independent executor’s motion to be dismissed from the
action on the ground that he was not a proper party due to the judicial
discharge. 48 Although the trial court originally imposed sanctions on the
grounds that there was no existing law supporting why the independent executor
Antonio Aug. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
37. Id. at *2.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Omohundro v. Ramirez-Justus, 392 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet.
denied).
43. Id.
44. In re Estate of Whittington, 409 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.).
45. Id. at 667.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 668.
48. Id.
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would be a proper party and that the argument to establish a new rule was
frivolous, the court later reconsidered and denied sanctions. 49
The Eastland Court of Appeals agreed that the independent executor was not
a proper party due to the judicial discharge. 50 A judicial discharge is designed for
the executor to “obtain a shield from any liability involving matters relating to
the past administration of the estate that have been fully and fairly disclosed.” 51
In addition, it would be absurd to force the executor to defend the will with his
or her own money after all of the estate assets have already been distributed and
there is no guarantee that the beneficiaries have retained any of those assets for
reimbursement purposes. 52 The court also agreed that sanctions were not
appropriate because this issue was a matter of first impression. 53
H. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE RIGHTS
In re Estate of Valdez confirms that a will contestant cannot be held liable for
tortious interference with inheritance rights. 54 After proponent filed
applications to probate the testatrix’s will, the contestant filed a will contest.55
The proponent then attempted to hold the contestant liable for tortious
interference with inheritance rights.56 The trial court granted the contestant a
summary judgment.57 The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. 58 Citing
Probate Code section 10C (now Estates Code section 54.001), the court
explained that Contestant could not be held liable “because his lawful act of
filing a will contest was not tortious conduct.” 59
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. JURISDICTION
Haga v. Thomas reminds us that Texas courts have jurisdiction regarding the
administration of Texas real property regardless of where the will was admitted
to probate. 60 The decedent was a North Carolina resident at the time of his
death. 61 The beneficiary was successful in getting a court in North Carolina to
admit the decedent’s will to probate. 62 After the decedent’s parents had a Texas
probate court admit the will to probate and construe how the will disposed of
Texas real property, the beneficiary appealed, claiming that the North Carolina
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 673.
In re Estate of Valdez, 406 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 234.
Haga v. Thomas, 409 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. filed).
Id. at 732.
Id. at 733.
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court had exclusive jurisdiction over the decedent’s will and the administration
of his estate. 63
The Houston First Court of Appeals affirmed. 64 The court began its analysis
by examining Probate Code section 95(a), which allows a probated will from
another state to be admitted to probate in Texas. 65 However, the court pointed
out that this section “does not address whether a Texas probate court has
jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the administration of an estate or the
construction of a will of a decedent who died in another state and was domiciled
in that other state, but who owned real property in Texas.” 66 The court reviewed
leading Texas cases and concluded that “the existence of real property in Texas
gives Texas courts jurisdiction over an administration concerning that
property.” 67
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO PROBATE WILL
In re Estate of Allen demonstrates that Texas courts are “quite liberal in
permitting a will to be offered as a muniment of title after the statute of
limitations has expired upon the showing of an excuse by the proponent for
failure to offer the will earlier.” 68 A wife filed her husband’s will for probate as a
muniment of title more than four years after his death. 69 The will left his entire
estate to his wife of over fifty-six years. 70 The trial court admitted the will to
probate under Probate Code section 73(a) after finding that the wife was not in
default for failing to probate the will within the four-year period.71 The testator’s
son appealed. 72
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed. 73 The court reviewed the facts,
which showed that the wife had consulted an attorney shortly after her
husband’s death.74 The attorney told her that she had the option of probating
the will as a muniment of title or executing an affidavit of heirship and that
regardless of which option she selected, she would receive the entire estate. 75
Because the wife wanted the estate handled quickly and inexpensively, she opted
for the affidavit of heirship. 76
When the wife and the son had a dispute over keeping livestock on certain
real property, the wife consulted a different attorney. 77 This attorney discovered
that her husband owned hundreds of acres of land as his separate property in
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 733–35.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 737.
In re Estate of Allen, 407 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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which his children would have a substantial interest under intestacy (e.g., twothirds outright plus a life estate in the wife’s life estate in the other one-third of
the property). 78 Within a month of learning of her children’s interest in the
property under the affidavit of heirship, the wife filed the will for probate. 79
The court of appeals reviewed the evidence and found that it was sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that the wife was not in default. 80 She relied on
the advice of her attorney in not probating the will in a timely manner. 81 She
had no legal training and had no reason to distrust her attorney when he
asserted that she would receive all of her husband’s property under an affidavit
of heirship.82 Once she realized that her first attorney had given her bad advice,
she promptly filed the will for probate. 83
C. APPEAL
Pine v. deBlieux demonstrates that in the gap period between the appellate
court’s opinion and the court’s issuance of its mandate, a final judgment of a
trial court is likely to be set aside if it conflicts with the opinion and mandate. 84
In a prior opinion, the Houston First Court of Appeals determined that the
administratrix was unsuitable as a matter of law. 85 The executrix sought review
by the Texas Supreme Court, which denied her petition. 86 The court of appeals
then issued its mandate. 87 However, in the interim, the trial court rendered a
final judgment disposing of some of the decedent’s assets. 88
When the trial court’s action was brought to the attention of the court of
appeals, the court of appeals held that the trial court should not have rendered a
final judgment while the unsuitable administratrix was still in office. 89
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s determination of the proper
recipient of certain decedent’s assets. 90
The court recognized that Probate Code section 28 (now Estates Code
section 351.053) allows the administratrix to continue to act and that Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 18.6 provides that an interlocutory order takes
effect when the mandate is issued. 91 However, the court explained that the
administratrix acted at her own peril when she continued to make claims to
estate property hoping that the Texas Supreme Court would grant her petition
and then find in her favor. 92
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pine v. deBlieux, 405 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
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D. BILL OF REVIEW
A party seeking an equitable bill of review must be certain to prove the
required elements. 93 For example, in the case of In re Estate of Aguilar, Son One
probated his father’s will as a muniment of title. 94 Seven months later, Son Two
attempted to set aside the probate by filing an equitable bill of review (not a
statutory bill of review under Probate Code section 31). 95 Both the trial court
and San Antonio Court of Appeals denied the application. 96
The court of appeals explained that to obtain an equitable bill of review, “the
applicant must plead and prove: (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying
cause of action, (2) which the applicant was prevented from making by the
fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3)
unmixed with any fault or negligence on its own part.” 97
Son Two attempted to rely on a special situation where absence of service or
lack of notice of the dispositive trial setting relieves the applicant from showing
the normal elements for an equitable bill of review. 98 The court rejected this
argument because the evidence showed that Son One gave proper notice of the
muniment of title action by posting as required by Probate Code section 128(a)
(this notice also demonstrates that element two was not satisfied). 99
E. ATTORNEY AD LITEM
A probate court judge may now appoint an attorney ad litem for a broader
range of individuals, including missing heirs and unknown or missing persons
for whom cash was deposited into the court’s registry. 100 In addition, the court
must tax the attorney ad litem’s compensation as a cost of the probate and order
that compensation to be paid out of the estate by any party, or, in the case of
funds in the court’s registry, from those funds. 101
F. APPLICATION FOR LETTERS TESTAMENTARY
The requirements for the contents of an application for letters testamentary
have changed. There are two key differences. First, the application must contain
the state of residence and physical address where service can be had of the
executor named in the will or the person to whom the applicant desires that
letters be issued. 102 Second, the application no longer needs to contain the
addresses of the witnesses. 103
93. See In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-12-00356-CV, 2013 WL 520282, at *2 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Feb. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
94. Id. at *9.
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *2.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3737, 2737–38
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 53.104).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 22, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2742–43 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 256.052).
103. Id.

112

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

G. PROOF OF FACTS
The 2013 legislature added Estates Code section 301.155 to provide that any
fact that must be provided, e.g., in applications for the issuance of letters, may
be provided by live testimony, or if the witness is unavailable, “by deposition on
written questions.” 104
H. BOND
A new provision, Estates Code section 305.004, addresses the procedure for
bond in the few cases where bond is required. 105 If the bond is timely filed, but
the court fails to take timely action on the bond, the personal representative may
file a motion for a hearing at which the judge must specify any objections to the
bond on the record. 106
I. EXECUTOR’S ABILITY TO RECOVER ESTATE PROPERTY
Family members have a tendency to grab a decedent’s assets even if they have
no authority to do so. The personal representative has a right to possession of all
estate assets and a duty to acquire that possession. 107 Obtaining a turnover order
is one way for the personal representative to satisfy that duty, as In re Estate of
Hutchins demonstrates. 108 One of the testatrix’s children obtained possession of
certain items of estate property without proper authority. The independent
executrix filed a “Motion for Turnover Order” in her attempt to force the child
to return the estate property. 109 She based her request on Probate Code section
37, which provides that the personal representative has “the right to possession
of the estate as it existed at the death of the testator.” 110 The trial court denied
the turnover motion on the basis that the independent executrix was not a
judgment creditor and thus could not use the turnover procedure provided in
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 31.002. 111 The independent
executrix petitioned for a writ of mandamus. 112
The Dallas Court of Appeals granted mandamus. 113 The court explained that
the independent executrix was not seeking a turnover order under the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 31.002. 114 Instead, Independent Executrix
was specifically requesting relief under Probate Code section 37, which gives the
personal representative the right to possession of all estate property. 115
104. Id. § 34, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2746.
105. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 305.004 (West 2014).
106. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 38, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2746–
47.
107. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 351.102 (West 2014).
108. In re Estate of Hutchins, 391 S.W.3d 578, 585 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
109. Id. at 581.
110. Id. at 584 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37, TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001,
101.003, 101.051).
111. See id. at 585.
112. Id. at 583.
113. Id. at 580.
114. Id. at 585.
115. Id.

2014]

Wills & Trusts

113

The court made two other findings. First, a separate lawsuit under Probate
Code section 233A, granting the personal representative the right to sue to
recover estate property, is not necessary to recover estate property under Probate
Code section 37. 116 Second, even if an alleged family agreement actually existed,
the personal representative is nonetheless entitled to possession of the estate as
it existed on the date of death; the court found no case which concluded that
section 37 is superseded by a family settlement agreement. 117
J. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
118

In re Estate of Arizola is instructive from two perspectives. First, the opinion
indicates that strict compliance with the statutorily required contents for an
application for letters may not be required. 119 The applicant for letters of
administration failed to list an heir in violation of Probate Code section 82(e). 120
The trial court nonetheless appointed the applicant.121 The San Antonio Court
of Appeals held that this error did not lead to an improper judgment as the
applicant was qualified and had a superior right to serve as the administrator.122
Accordingly, the court held that the appointment was proper.123
Second, although a dependent personal representative should usually seek
prior court approval (permission) rather than take the action and then seek
ratification (forgiveness), failure to do so is not necessarily a breach of duty. 124
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to remove an
administrator for misapplication, waste, or embezzlement of estate assets under
Probate Code section 222(a)(F) merely because he filed a motion seeking
ratification of certain conduct. 125 The court explained that although seeking
prior court approval may be a better approach, failure to do so is not clear and
convincing evidence of a misapplication or embezzlement. 126
K. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION
1. Consent Rules
New rules govern the individuals who must consent to an independent
administration if the decedent did not provide for one in his or her will. First, if
the will contains a pour-over provision, the beneficiaries of the trust who receive
property outright upon the decedent’s death must consent. 127 Second, a minor’s
natural guardian may consent to the appointment of a successor on the minor’s
116. Id. at 588.
117. Id. at 588–89.
118. In re Estate of Arizola, 401 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).
119. Id. at 670–71.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 667.
122. Id. at 671.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 673.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 51, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2750
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 401.004).
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behalf if there is no conflict of interest. 128 Third, if the beneficiary of a
testamentary trust is incapacitated, the trustee may file an application to
continue the administration or consent for the beneficiary as long as the trustee
is not the proposed successor. 129
2. Removal
The court may now remove an independent executor without notice in
specified circumstances, such as if there are sufficient grounds to believe the
executor has misapplied or embezzled estate property. 130 In addition, removal is
authorized with mere written notice by certified mail if the executor does not
timely qualify or file the inventory or affidavit in lieu thereof. 131
3. Distribution
If the court becomes involved in the distribution of an estate being
independently administered, the court is now permitted to order distribution of
undivided interests in property if it is incapable of distribution without a prior
partition or sale. 132
L. CREDITORS
The deadline for a creditor to submit a claim was changed from four months
to 120 days, which could make a difference depending on the number of days in
the relevant months (thirty-one day long months or the short month of
February). 133
M. INVENTORY
1. Use of Affidavit in Lieu of Inventory Expanded
The typical language creating an independent administration provides, “I
direct that no action be had in any court other than the probating of this will
and the filing of an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims.” This language
could be interpreted as requiring the filing of the inventory. The 2013
legislature made it clear that the affidavit in lieu of inventory option is available
even if the will requires the filing of inventory, as long as the will does not
specifically prohibit the filing of an affidavit in lieu of inventory. 134 In addition,
the amendment added the word “required” before “inventory” in the statutory
language typically included in a will to create an independent administration to
reduce this problem further. 135
128. Id. § 57, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2753 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 404.005).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 56, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2752–53 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 404.003
and adding §§ 404.0035, 404.0036, & 404.0037).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 58, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2753 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 405.001).
133. Id. §§ 39, 45, & 53, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2747, 2749, & 2751 (amending TEX. EST.
CODE ANN. §§ 308.054, 355.060, & 403.055).
134. Id. § 41, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2747–48 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.056).
135. Id.
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2. Liability Protection
An executor cannot be held liable for the executor’s decision to file either a
traditional inventory or the affidavit in lieu of inventory. 136
3. Remedies
A person dissatisfied with an affidavit in lieu of inventory now has the same
potential remedies as a person dissatisfied with a traditional inventory.137
4. Penalty for Failure to File
The legislature added Estates Code section 309.057 to allow the court to
impose a fine, not to exceed $1,000, on any personal representative who does
not file an inventory (or affidavit in lieu of inventory) after being cited for failing
to do so.138
5. Successor Personal Representative
A successor personal representative only needs to file an inventory listing the
undistributed assets remaining on the date of the successor’s qualification if the
previous representative had already filed an inventory. 139
N. EXEMPT PROPERTY
1. Homestead
The homestead will be protected from most creditors only if the decedent was
survived by a person entitled to claim homestead occupancy rights, that is, a
spouse or minor child.140
2. Allowances
The allowance in lieu of homestead was raised to $45,000 from $15,000. 141
The allowance for other exempt property was raised to $30,000 from $5,000. 142
3. Family Allowance
A family allowance will not be available for an adult incapacitated child if the
decedent was not supporting the child at the time of the decedent’s death.143

136. Id. (adding TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.056(d)).
137. Id. § 43, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2748 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.103).
138. Id. § 42, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2748.
139. Id. § 46, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2749 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 361.155).
140. Id. § 8, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2739 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 102.004).
141. Act of June 14, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 647, § 1.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1732, 1732
(amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 273) & § 2.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1733 (amending TEX.
EST. CODE ANN. § 353.053).
142. Id.
143. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 44, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2748–49
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 353.101).
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O. BANK ACCOUNT RECOVERY
Coffey v. Bank of America teaches that an executor who wishes to claim that a
decedent’s checks were not properly payable must act promptly to provide
detailed notice to the financial institution. 144 In addition, the executor must
remember that survivorship, trust, and pay-on-death accounts are nonprobate
assets and that the new owner of the account should bring any claims associated
with the account. 145 In Coffey, after the depositor died, the executrix claimed
that the bank paid checks that were not properly payable and thus the estate
should recover the amounts of those checks. 146 Both the trial court and
Beaumont Court of Appeals rejected the executrix’s claims on a variety of
grounds based on the Uniform Commercial Code. 147
The account at issue was a pay-on-death account. The bank proved that it
provided monthly statements to the depositor and, after the depositor’s death,
to the pay-on-death payee. 148 Because they did not report the alleged
unauthorized transactions within sixty days (the statutory one-year period having
been shortened by contract), it was too late to recover from the bank. 149 Besides,
the account was a nonprobate asset and not in the depositor’s estate. 150
The court of appeals pointed to Jefferson State Bank v. Lenk 151 as support for
Executrix’s claim that the time period did not actually begin to run until the
executrix was appointed.152 The court held that even if this were the case, the
executrix did not report the allegedly improper transactions to the bank until
after the time period had run. 153 The court explained that merely filing a lawsuit
within that time was insufficient, as the pleading did not specifically identify the
checks at issue.154
P. POWER OF SALE
Estates Code section 401.006 was clarified to make clear that a court may
grant a power of sale over personal property, as well as real property, if the court
authorizes the independent personal representative to sell property, even though
the will failed to grant a power of sale.155
Q. FINAL ACCOUNT
The personal representative must now provide a copy of the final account to
144. Coffey v. Bank of America, No. 09-12-0013-CV, 2013 WL 257363, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Jan. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
145. See id. at *6.
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *7.
150. See id. at *4.
151. Jefferson State Bank v. Lenk, 323 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2010).
152. Coffey, 2013 WL 257363, at *4.
153. Id. at *7.
154. Id.
155. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 52, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2750–51
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 401.006).
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everyone entitled to citation on the final account and thereafter file an affidavit
(or attorney’s certificate) listing details, including the names of these individuals
and that each of them was provided with a copy of the final account. 156
R. REGISTRY OF THE COURT
Property passing to an unknown or missing person may be turned over to the
court’s registry. This causes a problem because a court is ill-equipped to store
grandmother’s china and dad’s lawnmower. The court is now required to order
the representative to convert all the assets to cash and then deposit the cash.157
This procedure, however, could cause irreparable loss of family heirlooms.
S. ATTORNEY FEES
1. Fees Denied—Late Request
A party to a probate dispute who wishes to recover attorney’s fees should
request them in the original complaint or answer, or as shortly thereafter as
possible. Kirkland v. Schaff shows what happens if this advice is not followed. 158
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the probate court erred in allowing a trial
amendment to request attorney’s fees under Probate Code section 245. 159 The
probate court had already issued a final order removing the administrator from
office. 160 Accordingly, “the probate court abused its discretion by granting the
trial amendment and awarding appellees attorney’s fees after the probate court’s
final order removing appellant as administrator was signed.” 161
2. Fees Denied—Not in Estate’s Best Interest
An executor should have an actual basis in fact before seeking to recover
estate property. If an executor makes wild and unsupported accusations that
then trigger attorney’s fees, the court is unlikely to permit the recovery of those
fees from the estate, as in the case of In re Estate of Bessire.162 A son was
appointed as the independent executor of his mother’s estate. The son later
accused the mother’s daughter (his sister) of improperly taking money from their
mother’s estate before she died. 163 Extensive discovery proceedings and legal
maneuvering subsequently occurred, resulting in the son being removed as the
executor and the daughter being appointed in his place. 164 In addition, the son
was denied his attorney’s fees, which amounted to over $80,000. 165 The son
appealed. 166
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. § 47, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2749 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 362.005).
Id. § 48, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2750 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 362.011).
Kirkland v. Schaff, 391 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id.
In re Estate of Bessire, 399 S.W.3d 642, 650 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. denied).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 645.
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The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed. 167 After writing extensively on the
procedural aspects of the claim, the court focused on whether the evidence
supported a legal theory justifying the trial court’s denial of the son’s attorney’s
fees. 168 The court began its analysis by recognizing that the son was a fiduciary
and was charged with collecting estate property under Probate Code
section 233. 169 However, this duty must be exercised with reasonable care. 170
The court examined the evidence, which revealed that the son actually admitted
that he had no basis for his claim that the daughter had taken estate property. 171
Accordingly, the son’s attorney’s fees were not expended in the best interest of
the estate and should not be paid out of estate funds under Probate Code
section 242. 172 The court explained that “when the personal representative’s
own omission or malfeasance is at the root of the litigation, the estate will not
be required to reimburse the personal representative for his attorney’s fees.” 173
V. TRUSTS
A. VENUE
The legislature made changes to the venue provisions for trust actions when
there are multiple trustees. 174 These sections need to be carefully studied to
ascertain proper venue. Note that the sections may be in conflict if there are
multiple noncorporate trustees plus at least one corporate trustee.
B. DEFINITION OF “PROPERTY”
The “property” definition now expressly includes “property held in any digital
or electronic medium.” 175
C. SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION
A settlor will not be considered a beneficiary of a trust merely because the
settlor’s interest in the trust was created by the exercise of a power of
appointment by a third party. 176 Likewise, property contributed to a laundry list
of trusts will not be considered to have been contributed by the settlor. 177 These
changes help trusts retain spendthrift protection by assuring that the settlor is
not treated as a beneficiary.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 647.
169. Id. at 649–50.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Act of May 20, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 699, § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1807, 1813
(amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. ANN. § 115.002).
175. Id. § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1807 (amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004).
176. Id. § 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1807–08 (amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035).
177. Id.
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D. DISCOVERY
In re Paschall warns that an inter vivos trust may not be as private as once
believed because even remote claims to the trust property may result in the trust
instrument being discoverable. 178 The testatrix died with a will leaving her entire
estate to the trustee of her inter vivos trust. 179 Seven years later, a dispute arose
regarding the validity of the will and thus the passage of the estate under the
trust.180 Distant intestate heirs (first cousins, twice removed) were successful in
getting the trial court judge to order the production of the trust instrument.181
The executor sought a writ of mandamus asserting that the contestants lacked
standing. 182
The Waco Court of Appeals denied the writ. 183 The court explained that the
contestants have a contingent pecuniary interest in the estate, that is, if they are
successful in setting aside the will and proving they are the intestate heirs, they
would be entitled to the property that is now being held in the testatrix’s
trust. 184 Accordingly, they have standing to seek discovery of the trust
instrument. 185
E. FORFEITURE CLAUSES
The legislature made a parallel change to Property Code section 112.038 to
be consistent with the changes discussed above which were made to the Probate
and Estates Codes. 186
F. DECANTING
Texas has joined the growing number of states which have statutes granting
the trustee the power to decant, that is, to distribute trust principal to another
trust for the benefit of one or more of the beneficiaries of the original trust
under specified circumstances. 187 These provisions are lengthy and highly
complex. 188
G. PURCHASE OF INSURANCE
A corporate trustee may now purchase insurance underwritten or distributed
by an affiliate unless the settlor expressly prohibited doing so in the trust. 189
178. In re Paschall, No. 10-12-00339-CV, 2013 WL 474368, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 7,
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
179. Id.
180. Id. at *1.
181. Id. at *2.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id. at *7.
185. See id.
186. Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 351, § 3.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1122.
187. Act of May 20, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 699, § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1807, 1808
(adding Subchapter D to TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. Chapter 112).
188. See Melissa Willems, Decanting Trusts: Irrevocable, Not Unchangeable, 6 EST. PLAN. & COMM.
PROP. L.J. 35 (2014).
189. Act of May 23, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1337, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3549, 3549
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H. ALLOCATION OF TRUSTEE COMPENSATION
Rather than being required to allocate trustee compensation equally between
income and principal, the trustee may now allocate in any manner as long as it is
consistent with the trustee’s fiduciary duties. 190
I. ARBITRATION
In the landmark case of Rachal v. Reitz, the Texas Supreme Court held that an
arbitration clause in a trust is enforceable. 191 A beneficiary brought suit asserting
that the trustee misappropriated trust property and failed to provide a proper
accounting. 192 Because the settlor included a provision in his inter vivos trust
requiring the beneficiaries to arbitrate any dispute with the trustees, the trustee
moved to compel arbitration. 193 Both the trial court and the Dallas Court of
Appeals held that this provision was unenforceable. 194 The court of appeals
explained that a person cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute if the person
did not agree to relinquish the person’s ordinary right to litigate. 195 The
beneficiary is merely a recipient of equitable title to property and not a party to
the trust instrument. 196 A trust is a conveyance of property coupled with a split
of legal and equitable title and the imposition of fiduciary duties on the
trustee. 197 A trust is not an agreement or contract. 198
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration provision is
enforceable against the beneficiaries for two reasons. 199 First, the court will
enforce conditions the settlor attached to the gifts to carry out the settlor’s
intent. 200 The settlor included a clear statement that he wanted all disputes to be
arbitrated and thus the court will give effect to that provision. 201
Second, the Texas Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate. 202 Even though the beneficiaries did not expressly agree, they are
deemed to have agreed through the doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel”
because they accepted benefits of the trust and filed suit to enforce the terms of
the trust.203 These actions are the assent required to form an enforceable
arbitration agreement. 204 If a beneficiary is unhappy with the arbitration

(amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.053).
190. Id. §§ 2 & 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3549–50 (amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. §§
116.201 & 116.202).
191. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. 2013).
192. Id. at 842.
193. Id.
194. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. granted).
195. Id. at 310–11.
196. Id. at 310.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013).
200. Id. at 844.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 845.
203. Id. at 846–47.
204. Id. at 845–46.
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provision, the beneficiary may disclaim under Trust Code section 112.010. 205
The supreme court stated that “it would be incongruent to allow a beneficiary to
hold a trustee to the terms of the trust but not hold the beneficiary to those
same terms.” 206
This case raises the following issue and concerns:
• Although this was a trusts case, it would seem likely the court would
reach the same result if the arbitration provision was contained in a
will.
• Although beneficiaries do have the ability to disclaim before
accepting benefits, it is unlikely that beneficiaries read the trust and
seek legal advice about the consequences of accepting benefits.
Instead, beneficiaries just collect the benefits and study the trust
instrument in detail only when something goes wrong.
• The supreme court does not discuss how to handle the situation
where the beneficiaries are minors or incompetent individuals.
• Arbitration provisions may become boilerplate so that the
justification that the settlor intentionally imposed the requirement
may be problematic.
• If a settlor really wanted to mandate arbitration, the settlor could
include a provision requiring the trustee to obtain the beneficiary’s
written consent to arbitrate as a condition precedent to receiving
trust distributions.
J. BANKRUPTCY
The Supreme Court of the United States case of Bullock v. BankChampaign
teaches that a bankrupt trustee who breaches fiduciary duties, but not in an evil
manner, may be successful in getting a judgment based on that breach
discharged.207 The settlor created a trust for his children and named one of the
children as the trustee. 208 The trustee breached his fiduciary duties by borrowing
funds from the trust, and thus his siblings obtained a judgment against him for
the benefits he received from his self-dealing. 209 The trustee had previously
repaid all borrowed funds with interest, and the trial court determined that he
had no malicious motive. 210 The trustee later filed for bankruptcy and sought
discharge of the judgment. 211 The Bankruptcy Court held that the debt was not
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(4), which provides that discharge
is not available “as a debt for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” 212
Both the Federal District Court and the Eleventh Circuit agreed. 213

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 846.
Id. at 847.
Bullock v. BankChampaign, 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013).
Id. at 1757.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1755.
Id. at 1755–56.
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed. 214 The Court
explained that the debt could be discharged because the trustee was not (in this
author’s words) “evil.” 215 The Court held that for the debt to be nondischargeable, the trustee must have acted with a culpable state of mind
“involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature
of the fiduciary behavior.” 216
K. RECEIVERSHIP
It is well accepted that receivership is an “extreme” remedy and will be
granted “only where great emergency or imperative necessity requires it.” 217
Elliott v. Weatherman demonstrates this principle in a case where after the settlors
died, their three children became co-trustees of their trust. 218 Two of the trustees
sued the third trustee alleging that he had violated the terms of the trust,
breached fiduciary duties, and converted some of the trust property. 219 To
resolve this dispute, the trial court appointed a receiver upon the request of the
allegedly breaching trustee over certain assets of the trust as authorized by Trust
Code section 114.008(a)(5). 220 The other two trustees appealed. 221
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed. 222 The court stated that “[e]ven if a
specific statutory provision authorizes a receivership, a trial court should not
appoint a receiver if another remedy exists at law or in equity that is adequate
and complete.” 223 The court also explained that the two other trustees did not
have sufficient notice that the receivership remedy was requested, that is, a
minimum of three days’ notice under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 695
because real property was involved. 224 Even with respect to the personal property
subject to the receivership, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to
justify the appointment of a receiver without notice and the opportunity to be
heard. 225
VI. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. DISCLAIMERS
As of January 1, 2014, an heir or will beneficiary will no longer be able to
disclaim property if that person is in arrears in paying child support. 226 Every
214. Id. at 1761.
215. See id. at 1759.
216. Id. at 1757.
217. Krummnow v. Krummnow, 174 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied).
218. Elliott v. Weatherman, 396 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 227–28.
221. Id. at 229.
222. Id. at 225.
223. Id. at 228.
224. Id. at 229.
225. Id. at 229–30.
226. Act of May 22, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 689, §§ 1 & 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1790, 1790
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 122.051 and adding § 122.107).
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disclaimant must state in the disclaimer whether the beneficiary is a child
support obligor.227 Note that trust beneficiaries may still disclaim to avoid their
child support obligations because the legislature did not make changes to the
disclaimer provisions of the Trust Code. 228
B. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
Several changes were made to the statutory durable power of attorney form
provided in Estates Code section 752.051: (1) adding a more detailed
explanation in the instructions section on how a power of attorney operates, (2)
requiring the principal to initial in front of powers to be granted (rather than
crossing out powers the principal does not desire to grant), (3) including the
exercise of a general power of appointment if the principal initials the gifting
power, and (4) adding a comprehensive explanation of the agent’s duties. 229
A statutory probate court will have jurisdiction of actions brought by an agent
under a power of attorney arising out of the agent’s performance of the agent’s
duties as of January 1, 2014. 230 Previously, the statutory probate court’s
jurisdiction extended only to actions against the agent. 231
C. MEDICAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
The statutory form for the medical power of attorney was revised to reflect
changes made in 2009 permitting the principal to have the power acknowledged
before a notary rather than having it witnessed. 232
If a county has a statutory probate court, it now has concurrent jurisdiction
with the district court over actions to set aside the power due to the principal’s
lack of competency or being under duress, fraud, or undue influence. 233
D. LIFE INSURANCE
Upon divorce (or even while the divorce is pending), life insurance
beneficiary designations need to be updated to reflect the insured’s intent
because policies governed by federal law will not get the benefit of state law,
which typically automatically voids a beneficiary designation in favor of an exspouse.234 In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hillman v. Maretta, the insured
named his then-wife as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy covered by the
Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954. 235 The insured later
divorced the beneficiary and remarried, but he neglected to change the
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Act of May 22, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 700, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1816.
230. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2738
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.006).
231. Id.
232. Act of May 24, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 134, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 534, 534–37
(amending TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.163).
233. Id. § 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 537 (adding TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
166.165(a-1)).
234. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.005 (West 2011).
235. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).
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beneficiary of the policy. 236 After his death, both his current wife and his former
wife claimed the proceeds. 237 His current wife claimed that the divorce acted to
revoke Insured’s designation of his now ex-wife as a beneficiary under Virginia
law. 238 On the other hand, his former wife asserted that local law was preempted
by federal law, and thus the designation of her as the beneficiary remained
effective. 239 In addition, the former wife also claimed that the Virginia statute
holding her liable for the proceeds was likewise preempted even if preemption
occurred. 240 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the Virginia statute was
preempted and that the ex-wife was entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance
policy. 241
E. COMMUNITY PROPERTY SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENTS
A community property survivorship agreement is designed to provide
survivorship rights to community property, not to convert separate property into
community property. Unless the agreement also meets the requirement of a
conversion agreement, it will be ineffective to create survivorship rights in
separate property, as demonstrated by In re Estate of Cunningham. 242 A husband
and his wife entered into a community property survivorship agreement by using
a fill-in-the-blank form with the assistance of family members rather than an
attorney. 243 After the husband died, the trial court granted his wife’s application
to adjudicate the agreement as valid. 244 Four months later, one of the husband’s
children (the wife’s stepson) filed a bill of review under Probate Code section 31
claiming that the court made a substantial error because some of the property
allegedly covered by the agreement was actually the husband’s separate
property. 245 The trial court denied the bill of review. 246
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed. 247 The court explained that the
community property survivorship agreement, although purporting to include
“all inheritance property” within its scope, did not meet the requirements of
Family Code sections 4.203 and 4.205 to act as a conversion of separate
property (the inherited property) into community property which would then be
covered by the survivorship agreement. 248 For example, the agreement did not
state that they were converting separate property into community property. 249 In
addition, there was no evidence showing that either spouse received the required
fair and reasonable disclosure of the legal effect of converting separate property
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243.
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to community property. 250 Because the survivorship agreement did not convert
the husband’s separate property into community property, the original order was
substantially in error, and the trial court erred in not granting the bill of
review.251
F. MCKEEHAN V. MCKEEHAN OVERRULED
According to the Austin Court of Appeals case of McKeehan v. McKeehan, an
agreement relating to a nonprobate asset which contains a choice of law clause
causes that state’s law to govern the asset, such as whether the asset has the
survivorship feature. 252 The 2013 legislature added Estates Code section
111.054 to provide that if more than 50% of that asset (e.g., a bank account,
retirement plan, annuity, or insurance contract) was contributed by a Texas
resident, Texas law will determine whether the asset has the survivorship feature,
irrespective of any choice of law provision. 253 The applicability of this new
provision is based on the date of the owner’s death being on or after January 1,
2014, rather than the date on which the decedent entered into the agreement. 254
To enhance the likelihood of a court upholding this statute, the legislature
stated that the change represents “the fundamental policy of [Texas] for the
protection of its residents and [is] intended to prevail over the law of another
state or jurisdiction, to the extent those laws are in conflict with Texas law.” 255
G. IRAS
The 2013 Texas legislature clarified that Roth IRAs (both regular and
inherited) are protected from creditors. 256
H. BODY DISPOSITION
Because a marriage is terminated only by a court decree or death, a person in
the process of divorce needs to update his or her entire estate plan to remove the
spouse from the normal priority the spouse has to make financial, medical, and
body disposition arrangements. 257 In re Estate of Woods demonstrates the
importance of so doing. 258 After the decedent died, a battle ensued between his
surviving spouse and the independent executor, his son from a prior marriage,
over who has priority to decide on the disposition of the decedent’s cremains. 259
The trial court determined the son had priority. 260
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The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed. 261 The court pointed to Health & Safety
Code section 711.002(a) which states that the surviving spouse has priority over
body disposition if the deceased spouse did not make other arrangements. 262
The court held that it was irrelevant that decedent had filed for a divorce from
his wife a few months before his death. 263
VII. CONCLUSION
The new cases and legislation address a wide array of issues, some very narrow
and some with potentially broad impact. This article has already discussed the
practical application of the cases and statutes. It is also important to understand
some overarching principles that transcend individual cases and statutes and
form a pattern. Here are some examples of patterns this author detected:
• The testator’s intent is important in will construction and courts will
enforce and uphold provisions when the testator’s intent is clear. 264
• Timeliness and prompt action are required not only in will contests
but in giving notice to other parties.265
• Estate planning arrangements should be reviewed and changed
accordingly during and after divorce to remove former spouses as
beneficiaries or default decision makers. 266
• Courts will not “punish” without some solid basis for the
punishment. 267

261. Id.
262. Id. at 849.
263. Id. at 848.
264. Netherton v. Cowan, No. 04-12-00627-CV, 2013 WL 4091773 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Aug. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (testator’s will did not attach condition for interest to vest); Di
Portanova v. Monroe, 402 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (wills did not
prohibit consolidation and suit did not thwart testator’s intent); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840,
848 (Tex. 2013) (arbitration was condition settlor attached and court will enforce).
265. Coffey v. Bank of America, No. 09-12-0013-CV, 2013 WL 257363, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Jan. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (filing lawsuit was insufficient notice to bank so too
late to recover); Kirkland v. Schaff, 391 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (attorney’s
fees should be requested in original complaint or soon after); Omohundro v. Ramirez-Justus, 392
S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied) (suit barred because not brought on timely
basis).
266. In re Estate of Woods, 402 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.) (wife still had
priority over body disposition because divorce was not finalized); Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct.
1943 (2013) (state law automatically voiding ex-spouses as beneficiaries is preempted by federal law,
thus ex-wife was entitled to proceeds of life insurance policy).
267. In re Estate of Valdez, 406 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)
(will contest is lawful act and not tortious conduct); In re Estate of Allen, 407 S.W.3d 335, 339
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (relied on attorney’s bad advice, so not in default); Pine v.
deBlieux, 405 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (administratrix acted
“at her own peril” in continuing claims during “gap period” between court’s opinion and issuance
of mandate); Bullock v. BankChampaign, 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013) (bankrupt trustee who breached
duties could get judgment discharged because must have acted with “culpable” mind).

